Financial protectionism: the first tests by Rose, Andrew & Wieladek, Tomasz
External MPC Unit
Discussion Paper No. 32
Financial protectionism:  the first tests
Andrew K Rose and Tomasz Wieladek
May 2011
This document is written by the External MPC Unit of the Bank of EnglandExternal MPC Unit
Discussion Paper No. 32
Financial protectionism:  the first tests
Andrew K Rose
(1) and Tomasz Wieladek
(2)
Abstract
We provide the first empirical tests for financial protectionism, defined as a nationalistic change in banks’ lending
behaviour, as the result of public intervention, which leads domestic banks either to lend less or at higher interest
rates to foreigners.  We use a bank-level panel data set spanning all British and foreign banks providing loans
within the United Kingdom between 1997 Q3 and 2010 Q1.  During this time, a number of banks were
nationalised, privatised, given unusual access to loan or credit guarantees, or received capital injections.  We use
standard empirical panel-data techniques to study the ‘loan mix’, domestic (British) loans of a bank expressed as a
fraction of its total loan activity.  We also study effective short-term interest rates, though our data set here is much
smaller.  We examine the loan mix for both British and foreign banks, both before and after unusual public
interventions such as nationalisations and public capital injections.  We find strong evidence of financial
protectionism.  After nationalisations, foreign banks reduced the fraction of loans going to the United Kingdom by
about 11 percentage points and increased their effective interest rates by about 70 basis points.  By way of
contrast, nationalised British banks did not significantly change either their loan mix or effective interest rates.
Succinctly, foreign nationalised banks seem to have engaged in financial protectionism, while British nationalised
banks have not.
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The “Great Recession” which engulfed the world in 2008-09 is frequently compared 
to the Great Depression of the early 1930s.  Many economists blame trade protectionism for 
deepening, spreading, and/or lengthening the Great Depression.  This time around, there is 
only muted evidence of traditional trade protectionism, at least thus far. But the public 
sector has made substantial interventions in financial markets around the world, particularly 
in the banking sector, while cross-border bank lending has fallen. In this study we ask if 
government support for banks has reduced foreign lending to the UK and resulted in a new 
type of protectionism: financial protectionism. 
The Bank of England May 2009 Inflation Report documents that in the years before 
the global financial crisis, foreign lenders contributed substantially to the growth of lending 
to UK residents. Following the global financial crisis this type of foreign lending to the UK 
economy has fallen drastically. If this decline is temporary, due to, for example, increased 
risks in the UK economy as a result of the recession, foreign lenders will probably re-enter 
the UK market once the recovery is entrenched. On the other hand, if this phenomenon is 
longer lasting, possibly due to financial protectionism, the lack of access to foreign capital 
means that UK households and firms will need to roll over maturing loans over with 
alternative sources of funding. Whether or not the decline in foreign lending is a result of 
financial protectionism has therefore important implications for UK financial and monetary 
policy. 
We think of financial protectionism as a nationalistic change in banks’ lending 
behaviour, as the result of public intervention, which leads domestic banks either to lend 
less or at higher interest rates to foreigners. In this study, we take advantage of a panel data 
set on bank activity collected by the Bank of England.  This data set covers all banks, both 
foreign and domestic, which operating in the UK.  Our data spans 1997Q3 through 2010Q1, 
a period characterized by the most significant international financial crisis in decades, 
during which a number of British and foreign banks were nationalised or supported with 
capital injections and/or loan guarantees. Concurrently, most British and foreign banks did  
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not need to rely on explicit state support for their survival.  As such, this heterogeneity 
means that our data set is ideally suited to testing for financial protectionism.   
Our main focus is the fraction of domestic (British) loans a bank makes as a fraction 
of its total loan activity, a ratio we refer to as the “loan mix,” though we also investigate 
interest rates.  Our key finding is that after nationalisation, foreign banks reduced British as 
a share of total lending by about eleven percentage points, and increased interest rates on 
new loans to UK residents by 70 basis points.  By way of comparison, nationalisation does 
not seem to affect either the lending or interest rate decisions of British banks.  These results 
are robust to a variety of perturbations to the underlying empirical model.  Succinctly, 
foreign nationalised banks seem to have engaged in financial protectionism, which British 
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“We will not retreat into financial protectionism”   
  G20 Leaders' Statement from London Summit, April 20091 
  G20 Leaders' Statement from Pittsburgh Summit, September 20092 
 
1.   Introduction 
The “Great Recession” which engulfed the world in 2008-09 is frequently compared 
to the Great Depression of the early 1930s.  Many economists blame trade protectionism for 
deepening, spreading, and/or lengthening the Great Depression.  This time around, there is 
only muted evidence of traditional trade protectionism, at least thus far.3  But the public 
sector has made substantial interventions in financial markets around the world, particularly 
in the banking sector, while cross-border bank lending has fallen.   In this study we ask if 
government support for banks has reduced foreign lending and resulted in a new type of 
protectionism: financial protectionism. 
We think of financial protectionism as a nationalistic change in banks’ lending 
behaviour, as the result of public intervention, which leads domestic banks either to lend 
less or at higher interest rates to foreigners. While the idea of financial protectionism has 
been discussed informally for some time, to the best of our knowledge no other work has 
ever formally tested for the presence of financial protectionism in bank lending behaviour.4 
The lack of previous empirical work is not surprising to us, as publicly available data are 
typically aggregated and do not provide sufficient information to test this hypothesis 
rigorously.  In this study, we take advantage of a panel data set on bank activity collected by 
the Bank of England.  This data set covers all banks, both foreign and domestic, which 
operated in the UK, a rich country with a large international financial sector.   Our data 
spans 1997Q3 through 2010Q1, a period characterized by the most significant international 
financial crisis in decades, during which a number of British and foreign banks were 
nationalised or supported with capital injections and/or loan guarantees. Concurrently, most 
British and foreign banks did not need to rely on explicit state support for their survival.  As 
such, this heterogeneity means that our data set is ideally suited to testing for financial 
protectionism.    
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We use a standard panel data model with period- and bank-specific fixed effects to 
search for financial protectionism.  Our main focus is the fraction of domestic (British) loans 
a bank makes as a fraction of its total loan activity, a ratio we refer to as the “loan mix,” 
though we also investigate interest rates.  Our key finding is that after nationalisation, 
foreign banks reduced British as a share of total lending by about eleven percentage points, 
and increased interest rates on new loans to UK residents by 70 basis points.  By way of 
comparison, nationalisation does not seem to affect either the lending or interest rate 
decisions of British banks.  These results are robust to a variety of perturbations to the 
underlying empirical model.  Succinctly, foreign nationalised banks seem to have engaged in 
financial protectionism, which British nationalised banks have not. 
 
2.  Data and Methodology 
 
2.1  The Data Set 
Strategy.  Our objective in this study is to test for financial protectionism in an 
unabashedly empirical fashion.5  The aggregate data series lends at least prima facie 
plausibility to the idea that lenders cut back more dramatically on their cross-border activity 
than on their domestic activity.  Figure 1 plots the growth of lending to British business over 
the past few years.  The superficial impression one gets is that during the Great Recession, 
foreign lenders (taken to mean banks with headquarters outside the UK) contracted their 
activity more dramatically than British lenders (banks with headquarters in the UK).  But 
such aggregate evidence provides at most indirect support for the presence of financial 
protectionism.6  Only if foreign public  institutions contracted their British loans more than 
foreign private institutions, would we have strong prima facie evidence of financial 
protectionism. 
We are interested in examining if public interventions, such as bank privatisation or 
nationalisation, skew either the prices that banks charge for foreign (as opposed to domestic) 
loans, or their quantity.  Most publicly available data sets provide insufficient information to 
answer this question rigorously.  For instance, the BIS provides two data sets on cross-border  
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bank lending, “locational” (e.g., Buch, 2003) and “consolidated” (e.g., Rose and Spiegel, 
2004).   However, neither allows one to differentiate domestic from foreign lending, let 
alone lending for e.g., nationalised as opposed to private banks.  Laeven and Valencia (2010) 
study systemic banking crises and provide data on bank nationalisations during these crises.  
However, these authors use aggregated data and are also unable to differentiate the effects of 
public intervention on domestic as opposed to foreign financial activity.  Since aggregation 
may thus mask the effects of financial protectionism, it is best to test for this phenomenon 
using data at the institution specific level.  For such reasons, it seems natural to test for 
financial protectionism at the level of individual institutions.  However, publicly available 
disaggregated databases such as BankScope do not provide information on individual 
institutions’ external claims.7  A good test for financial protectionism requires data on both 
external and domestic lending at the level of individual institutions, some of which were 
affected by public interventions during the sample period. 
Source of Financial Data.  Fortunately, for the purposes of this investigation, the 
Monetary and Financial Statistics Division at the Bank of England have kindly provided us 
with an appropriate data set.  It includes quarterly data with a host of information for all 
banks resident in the UK.8  London’s status as a major international financial centre means 
that the banking system of the UK has considerable diversity, enabling us to search credibly 
for indications of financial protectionism in the behaviour of both British and foreign banks.  
This rich dataset is substantially better suited to test for financial protectionism than 
publicly available datasets.  Unfortunately, it has a substantive disadvantage for academic 
research; for obvious reasons, the data set is confidential. 
The data set provides us with a complete set of balance sheet data for every 
institution in the UK banking sector, as all banks operating in the UK must provide this 
information to the Bank of England under the present regulatory regime.9  Internally, the 
Bank of England uses this confidential data set to help carry out its financial and monetary 
stability objectives.  Externally, the data is passed on the FSA for the purposes of bank 
regulation and to the Office of National Statistics, where it features as one of the building 
blocks of the UK’s national accounts.  Since the accuracy of this data set potentially affects a  
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host of economics spheres, there is every reason to believe that the Bank of England takes its 
measurement seriously. 
Reporting institutions must provide the data to the Bank of England in several 
“forms.”  The “AL” form of the dataset provides disaggregated loans and advances granted to 
UK residents (including monetary and financial institutions). The “CC” form provides 
disaggregated series on a reporting institution’s total claims on non-residents.10  We combine 
AL and CC series to derive our key regressand, the “loan mix” ratio.  The loan mix measures 
the ratio of British to total bank lending, and is our dependent variable of choice.  The data 
set on loan mix is available quarterly from 1997Q3 until 2010Q1 for a total of 487 banks (not 
all of which have complete series). As of May 2010, 56 of these banks are British according 
to the Bank of England, while the rest are foreign.  Further details on the construction of 
our variables are available in the data appendix. 
British banks seem naturally to lend more inside the UK, at least compared with 
foreign banks.  This is clear from Figure 2, which provides histograms of the loan mix for 
British and foreign banks.  The behaviour of the loan mix ratio suggests that British banks 
tend naturally to lend relatively more at home (the distribution is skewed towards one), 
while foreign banks lend more abroad (the distribution is skewed towards zero).  This does 
not necessarily indicate financial protectionism, since Figure 2 combines data from publicly-
owned, privately-owned banks, and a number of banks whose ownership switched.  The 
question we ask is whether a bank’s behaviour – that is, its loan mix – changes following a 
large public intervention.  Regression analysis of the loan mix permits us to explore whether 
or not a bank changes its preferences for domestic, as opposed to foreign, lending, following 
events like nationalisation. 
Data on loan rates provides us with an alternative, inferior, way to test for financial 
protectionism.  In particular, the “ER” form provides information on disaggregated effective 
interest rates on new loans, weighted by loan size.11  Unfortunately, these data are available 
over a shorter span of time (only from 2004Q1), and only for the largest institutions (though 
these collectively make up three-quarters of total lending to any particular sector).12    
 
External MPC Unit Discussion Paper No.32 May 2011 7
We also take advantage of data provided by the “BT” and “PL” forms, which contain 
in-depth information of the reporting institution’s balance sheet and income/expenditure 
statement, respectively.  The additional data from these forms are used to construct several 
control variables such as the non-performing loan ratio and measures of capital adequacy, 
liquidity, and profitability. 
Source of Public Intervention Data.  Which of the (487) banks in our sample have 
been affected by public interventions during the sample period?  In early August 2010, we 
conducted bank-by-bank Google searches for ‘ “bank name” nationalisation nationalise 
privatize’ where “bank name” was the precise name of the individual bank in question 
(according to the Bank of England data set).  The clues we discovered from these searches 
lead us to investigate approximately 150 banks in detail.  As we found convincing evidence 
of public interventions, we constructed suitable binary dummy variables (which take on the 
value of one at the time of and after public intervention, and are otherwise zero).  
Subsequently we discovered a number of disaggregated data sets on public interventions in 
banks; we have used these to check and corroborate our classifications.13 
We gathered data on four types of public intervention: 1) nationalisations, 2) 
privatisations, 3) injections of public capital, and 4) unusual access to loans, guarantees or 
liquidity.  We focus on bank nationalisations in our empirical work.  When a bank receives 
a public capital injection, it is difficult to measure the government’s effective influence on 
the bank, since private bank capital is difficult to measure during the very times of crisis 
when capital is injected.  Some banks received capital injections that were minor compared 
with their existing capital; they remained, for the most part, private institutions.  Other 
banks were essentially nationalised when they received capital injections.  For this reason, it 
seems unwise to assume that all banks treat capital injections similarly.  Access to unusual 
liquidity facilities or loan guarantees is even more problematic, since these forms of 
assistance are quite heterogeneous.14  Further, capital injections and other forms of public 
assistance can occur repeatedly; the effect of such assistance is also likely to be 
heterogeneous, especially since repeated rescues are sometimes implicitly guaranteed in 
advance.  Nationalisation, by way of contrast, is a more clear-cut and discrete event.  
Nationalisation is also more discrete than bank privatisation (which is often spread over  
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period of time).  Since bank privatisation tends to occur during periods of tranquillity, the 
associated effects on lending decisions are not likely to be “the opposite” of bank 
nationalisation, which occurs in times of crisis.  For all these reasons, bank nationalisation 
seems like the most obvious measure of public intervention likely to result in detectable 
financial protectionism.  Figure 3 provides a set of four histograms for British banks; three 
present public interventions and the last presents “tranquil” observations (i.e., those without 
any intervention).  Each histogram graphs the number of relevant observations, organized 
into bins corresponding to the loan mix. 
 
2.2  Methodology 
We begin to explore our data set with a simple panel data model. We start by 
estimating the following regression equation: 
 
Domi,t/(Domi,t+Fori,t) = αi + βt + γNati,t + γUKNatUK,i,t + δPrivi,t + δUKPrivUK,i,t  
+ ζCapi,t + ζUKCapUK,i,t + θLLi,t  + εi,t   (1) 
 
where:  
  Domi,t is lending to domestic (British) residents by bank i at time t;  
  For is lending to foreign residents;  
  {αi} is a comprehensive set of bank-specific fixed effects;  
  {βt} is an analogous set of time fixed effects;  
  Nati,t is a dummy variable which takes a value of one when a British bank i is 
nationalised at or before time t, minus one if a foreign bank is nationalised at or 
before time t, and is otherwise zero;  
  NatUK,i,t is a dummy variable which takes a value of one when British bank i is 
nationalised at or before time t, and is otherwise zero;   
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  Priv, Cap, and LL are analogues for banks that are privatised, the recipients of public 
capital injections, and receive unusual access to liquidity, or loan guarantees; 
  ε is a well-behaved disturbance term;  
  {γ}, {δ}, {ζ}, and {θ} are coefficients. 
The coefficients of greatest interest to us are γ and γUK .  They measure the permanent effect 
of bank nationalisation on the loan mix. We note in passing that our loan mix regressand is 
unaffected by changes in total lending. 
Financial protectionism might be expected to result in British banks increasing the 
share of British loans in their loan portfolios following a public intervention like 
nationalisation; symmetrically, foreign banks might be expected to reduce the British share 
of their loan mix.15  That is, we have constructed our dummy variable such that financial 
protectionism, if it exists, would be manifest in a positive and significant γ coefficient.  Of 
course, British and foreign responses to nationalisation may not be similar quantitatively.  
Accordingly, we check whether the behaviour of public interventions is the same for British 
and foreign owned banks.  We also do not assume but instead check for the equality of 
responses to different public interventions (like nationalisation, capital injections, and so 
forth).   
We estimate our equation with least squares, though we provide a variety of 
alternative estimators below to ensure the robustness of our results.  We present robust 
standard errors that are clustered by time, though again we also check that our results are 
not sensitive to this assumption.  We cluster by time since public interventions in our 
sample are in practice temporally concentrated.  Table 1 provides some relevant evidence; it 
tabulates the proportion of different interventions in particular periods of time.  Half of all 
bank nationalisations in the sample took place during the second half of 2008 when the 
financial crisis was at its peak.  Other interventions (such as public capital injections) are 
even more concentrated. 
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3.  Results 
3.1  Lending  
Estimates of equation (1) are presented in Table 2.   Our interest in this table is 
mostly in checking for two types of symmetry: a) between different types of public 
interventions (nationalisations, capital injections and so forth); and b) between British and 
foreign bank responses to public interventions.   Since there were no British bank 
privatisations during our data sample, we can only test the symmetry between British and 
foreign responses to nationalisations, public capital injections, and unusual access to loan or 
liquidity facilities.  We begin with that task. 
The results in Table 2 indicate that there is a statistically negligible difference 
between British and foreign access to both capital injections and unusual loan or liquidity 
facilities.  Both δUK and ζUK are not only statistically insignificant at conventional levels but 
have the same signs as δ and ζ.  When we test the restriction δUK=ζUK=0, the restriction is 
consistent with the null hypothesis at better than the .2 confidence level.  The same cannot 
be said of the British and foreign responses to bank nationalisation; the loan mix of British 
banks responds much less to a degree that is both economically and statistically significant.  
Accordingly, we impose the reasonable restrictions (of symmetric responses to British and 
foreign capital injections and unusual access to loan/liquidity facilities) and re-estimate our 
equation; these estimates are presented in the right-hand column.  The results are tabulated 
in the column at the right of Table 2. 
  Our chief interest is the effect of bank nationalisation on the loan mix.  
Nationalisation seems to have a significant effect on the loan mix; foreign bank reduce their 
proportion of British to total lending by over ten percentage points.  This is a large economic 
effect, which is also highly statistically significant; the t-statistic for the hypothesis of no 
effect is 5.3.  It is also interesting to note that the coefficient on the British nationalisation 
dummy variable is of almost identical magnitude but opposite sign; that is, British bank 
nationalisation appears to have no economically (or statistically) significant effect on the 
loan mix.  The substantive evidence of financial protectionism after foreign bank  
 
External MPC Unit Discussion Paper No.32 May 2011 11
nationalisation is our most striking finding, especially when combined with the absence of 
any indication of a comparable reaction by British banks. 
The results of Table 2 indicate that other public interventions also have effects on the 
loan mix.  These effects differ by the type of intervention.  Banks that are granted unusual 
access to loan or liquidity facilities seem to engage in financial protectionism; British banks 
raise the proportion of British loans in their portfolios by almost three percentage points 
(foreign banks lower their British loan mix by the same amount).  Capital injections have a 
smaller effect which is curiously negatively signed, indicating that foreign banks which 
receive public capital actually increase the proportion of British loans in their portfolios, 
though only by a small amount (just over one percentage point).  Privatised foreign banks 
reduce the proportion of British loans by over ten percentage points, a statistically and 
economically significant amount.  Unfortunately, some of these results are sensitive to 
minor econometric assumptions, as we now show. 
3.2  Sensitivity Analysis 
Table 3 checks the robustness of our key results in twelve different ways; each row in 
the table represents a separate least squares regression.  Since a) there are no British bank 
privatisations during the sample and b) foreign British and foreign bank nationalisations 
have separate effects, we replace our “symmetric” (+1 British/0/-1 Foreign) dummy variables 
with conventional (+1/0) dummy variables. 
We begin by using an alternative definition of our dependent variable; specifically, 
we replace CC15 (Total external claims on non-resident customers) in the denominator with 
CC1 (Loans and advances to non-residents).  Our key nationalisation results using the two 
ratios are very similar, though coefficient estimates for other interventions vary somewhat 
in significance.  Next we check that our standard error assumptions are not critical by 
providing two alternatives; robust standard errors that are not clustered, and traditional 
standard errors.  The statistical significance of our nationalisation results is unaffected, 
though different standard errors do affect the significance of other public interventions.  
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Next, we weight our least squares regressions in two different ways: by the natural 
logarithm of total bank loans (the denominator of our loan mix dependent variable), and by 
the log of total assets.  Neither of these checks appears to affect the results much.  Adding 
these variables as controls (instead of weighting by them) also seems to affect the results 
little.  Since the loan mix is a limited dependent variable, we also estimate our equation with 
an appropriate censored technique (Tobit), but again this does not affect our results much.16 
We also cut our sample of data in a number of different ways.  First, we divide the 
sample into big and small banks, using the median bank loan portfolio (the denominator of 
our dependent variable) as the dividing point.  The results differ by bank size; bigger banks 
that are nationalised seem to engage in more financial protectionism, as seems intuitive.  
The responses of smaller banks to public interventions are not statistically significant from 
zero.   Next, we check whether our results are sensitive to the inclusion of particular 
observations.  Our results are little affected by dropping the earlier part of our sample, , 
though the privatisation effect drops by an order of magnitude.  Our last test in this vein is 
to drop all observations with a residual which lie more than two standard errors from the 
mean.  However, this does not have a major effect on our key coefficient, indicating that 
outliers are not responsible for our results. 
To summarize: the effects of unusual access to loans or liquidity, and public capital 
injections are not always robust when we investigate minor perturbations to the basic 
econometric methodology.  However, both foreign bank nationalisations and privatisations 
seem consistently to lower the proportion of British loans in the portfolios of foreign banks.  
These effects are usually economically large (around ten percentage points), and statistically 
significant.  While there have been no British bank privatisations during our sample period, 
the British bank nationalisations have had no consistently large effect on the loan mix, from 
either an economic or statistical perspective. 
3.3  Adding Extra Controls 
So far we have shown that our default results seem fairly robust to various model 
specifications.  However, omitted variable bias remains a serious concern even though we 
have included both time- and bank-specific fixed effects.  Accordingly, we construct a set of  
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nine other control variables which have been used in microeconometric studies of bank 
lending (e.g., Ehrman, Gambacorta, Martinez-Pages, Sevestre and Worms, 2001, and 
Kashyap and Stein (2000)).  The variables we consider are: a) loan growth; b) asset growth; 
c) two variants of the capital adequacy ratio; d) two measures of leverage; and e) a measure 
of a banks dependency on the wholesale market (the precise definitions of these variables 
are in the data appendix).   
We add the nine extra control variables one by one to our default model, and present 
the results in Table 4a.  It turns out that our key estimates seem to be robust to the inclusion 
of the controls we consider.  Regardless of which extra control variable we include, the 
coefficients suggest that foreign nationalisations have a statistically significant effect on the 
domestic share of lending of around ten percentage points, while the effect of British 
nationalisations is not statistically significantly different from zero.  Including the control 
variables also does not substantially change the effects of the other public interventions we 
consider. 
At the bottom of Table 4a we successively add two sets of dummy variables to the 
default specification.  The first set isolates the periods after a bank switches its regulatory 
status.  There are three types of banks in our sample.  UK-owned banks have their 
headquarters in the UK and are regulated by the FSA.  There are also subsidiaries of foreign 
banks which operate in the UK and can take deposits; they are therefore subject to FSA 
capital requirements.  Finally, there are branches of foreign banks which operate in the UK 
and can only lend without taking deposits; these are not subject to FSA regulation.  Banks 
sometimes switch from one category to another, as for instance when Santander Bank 
purchased Abbey National in 2004.  For each of the (seventeen) banks that switched 
regulatory status in the sample, we add a dummy which is one for the bank during the 
period after the switch in regulatory regime, and zero otherwise.  As can be seen, adding 
these controls has little impact on our results. 
The final set of controls we add are interactions between a bank’s nationality and 
time-specific fixed effects (we note in passing that 51 banks in the sample switched their 
nationality).  These fixed effects allow us to ignore any shocks that are common to the banks  
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from a particular country at any point in time (e.g., national business cycle or foreign 
exchange rate shocks).  Adding this (large number of) fixed effects also has little impact on 
our key results. 
We can add a number of other control variables of interest if we limit our data 
sample.  In particular, the “PL” form allows us to construct a number of potentially relevant 
ratios: a) the ratio of non-performing loans to total assets; b) three variants of the profit rate 
(profits as a proportion of assets); and c) the dividend to asset ratio.  We add these ratios one 
by one, and report the results in Table 4b.  Since the PL form has only been available since 
2004, the number of observations used for each of the regressions (reported in individual 
rows of Table 4b) is 3,742, less than 40% of the sample used to generate the estimates of 
Table 4a.  However, despite the smaller sample size, our results still seem robust.  There is 
one exception; when we add the non-performing loan ratio, the size of the foreign 
nationalisation effect approximately halves and is only significantly different from zero at 
the 7.3% confidence level. 
Our results do not change much when we include a number of the extra control 
variables simultaneously (instead of one at a time).  We divide the extra controls into two 
groups, and present the results in Table 5.  The first set contains the controls of Table 4a: 
loan growth; asset growth; log total assets; capital adequacy; assets/capital (leverage); and 
wholesale market dependence.  The second set includes the controls included in Table 4b: 
the non-performing loan ratio; the dividend ratio; and the profit ratio.  Our base-line results 
are confirmed when we include all of the controls in the first group.  As expected, when 
include the second set of controls and the number of observations is reduced accordingly, 
our results are weaker.  
3.4  Interest Rates 
If the banking sector is perfectly competitive, banks are price-takers and the effects 
of financial protectionism on a bank’s behaviour might only be observable in the quantity of 
lending, but not in interest rates charged on new loans.  With imperfect competition on the 
other hand, standard bank lending models predict that banks can charge interest rates which 
are above their cost of capital (Freixas and Rochet, 2008).  Since previous work has rejected  
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the hypothesis of perfect competition in the UK banking system (Claessens and Laeven, 
2004), it seems worthwhile to explore whether we find evidence of financial protectionism 
in individual banks’ interest rate decisions.  If banks engage in financial protectionism 
following nationalisation, we would expect foreign banks to raise interest rates on British 
loans following nationalisation and mutatis mutandis.  Accordingly, we repeat our analysis, 
but substitute interest rates for the loan mix as our dependent variable. 
Table 6 is an analogue to Table 3, but uses the effective interest rate on new private 
non-financial corporation loans of less than one year maturity as the dependent variable 
(instead of the loan mix).  We measure interest rates this way since a larger group of banks 
lends to the private non-financial corporation sector than to any other sector.  
Unfortunately, interest rate data are only available since 2004Q1 for a relatively small 
number (less than forty) of the largest banks active in the UK.  Still, while the estimates of 
Table 6 are based on a small sample of data, they corroborate the results we obtained above 
with the ‘loan mix’.  In particular, foreign banks seem to demand interest rates on loans to 
British companies that are about seventy basis points higher after nationalisation.  By way of 
contrast, nationalised British banks do not seem to lend at lower rates to UK resident non-
financial private companies, as the financial protectionism hypothesis would suggest.  There 
is also weaker evidence that unusual access to loans or liquidity results in financial 
protectionism manifest in interest rates. 
Of course, it could still be the case that British banks charge higher interest rates 
abroad following nationalisation. Unfortunately we do not have the data to test this 
proposition. The same is true for nationalised foreign banks’ interest rate behaviour abroad. 
It is, on the other hand, reassuring that the difference in the behaviour of foreign and British 
nationalised banks is robust to whether we use the ‘loan mix’ or interest rates as the 
dependent variable.  
3.5  A Note on Endogeneity 
Are there reasons to believe that our key regressors – massive public interventions 
like nationalisations – are simultaneously determined with the bank’s choice of loan mix?  
Alternatively, is there any reason to believe that reverse causality is a problem, with a bank’s  
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loan mix driving public interventions?  We think it unlikely; it unclear to us that bank 
nationalisations and the like are much affected by the domestic/foreign loan ratio, at least in 
our data context.  While many British loans did sour during the “Great Recession” of 2008-
09, so did many loans abroad; the crisis was a global phenomenon. 
Furthermore, bank nationalisations are rare events, and often occur because of 
inadequate risk management.  In rich countries like the UK, it seems unlikely that the loan 
mix is a significant source of such risk.  We nevertheless tried a series of instrumental 
variables, consisting of the controls used in Tables 4 and 5, but none of them produced 
statistically significant results for the coefficients of interest to us.17  This is probably because 
the variables we considered are weak instrumental variables, as they are not significantly 
correlated with our dummy variables for public interventions (nationalisation, and the like). 
 
4.  Conclusion 
In this paper, we have provided the first rigorous evidence of financial protectionism.  
We take advantage of a uniquely suitable confidential bank-level panel data set collected by 
the Bank of England which includes the activities of all banks operating in the UK from 
1997Q3 through 2010Q1.  Our methodology consists in a plain-vanilla “difference in 
difference” panel data regression model, which controls for time- and bank-specific fixed 
effects.  We find that foreign banks which have been nationalised reduce their proportion of 
British to total lending by about eleven percentage points; they also raise loans rates for 
British companies by about 70 basis points.  But financial protectionism is not universal. In 
contrast to their foreign counterparts, there is no evidence that nationalised British banks 
changed their lending behaviour in any substantive way. 
Our main message from this study is that the behaviour of foreign banks operating in 
the UK seems to be consistent with financial protectionism.  Both the microeconomic causes 
of this behaviour and its macroeconomic consequences (if any) remain unknown. We leave 
those important issues for future research.  
 
External MPC Unit Discussion Paper No.32 May 2011 17
References 
Ait-Sahalia, Y, Andritzky, J, Jobst, A, Nowak S and N Tamirisa (2009) ‘How to Stop a Herd 
of Running Bears? Market Response to Policy Initiatives during the Global Financial Crisis’ 
IMF Working Paper No. 09/204. 
 
Aiyar, Shekhar (2011) ‘How did the Crisis in International Funding Markets Affect Bank 
Lending?  Balance Sheet Evidence from the United Kingdom’ Bank of England Working 
Paper No. 424. 
 
Buch, C (2003) ‘Information or Regulation: What Drives the International Activities of 
Commercial Banks?’ Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, Vol.  35(6), pp. 851-869. 
 
Claessens, Stijn and L Laeven (2004) ‘What Drives Bank Competition? Some International 
Evidence’,  Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, Vol.  36(3), pp. 563-83. 
 
Ehrmann, M, Gambacorta,L , Martinez-Pages, J, Sevestre, P  and  A Worms (2001) ‘Financial 
systems and the role of banks in monetary policy transmission in the Euro area’, Working 
Paper Series 105, European Central Bank. 
 
Freixas, X and Rochet, J C (2008) ‘Microeconomics of Banking’ Princeton University Press, 
April. 
 
Kashyap, A and J Stein (2000) ‘What Do a Million Observations on Banks Say about the 
Transmission of Monetary Policy?’ American Economic Review, vol. 90(3), pp. 407-428 
 
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer (2002) ‘Government 
Ownership of Banks’ The Journal of Finance LVII-1, 265-301. 
 
 Laeven, L and L Valencia (2010) ‘Resolution of Banking Crisis: The Good, the Bad and the 
Ugly’ IMF Working Paper No. 10/146, June 2010.  
 
External MPC Unit Discussion Paper No.32 May 2011 18
 
Megginson, William L. (2005) ‘The Economics of Bank Privatization’ Journal of Banking & 
Finance 29, 1931-1980. 
 
Rose, A and M Spiegel (2004) ‘A Gravity Model of Sovereign Lending: Trade, Default, and 




Table 1: Temporal Clustering of Public Interventions 
 Nationalisation 




Unusual Access to 
Loan Guarantee (30 
British/10 Foreign) 
2008Q3  20 0  5 
2008Q4  30 70 83 
2008H2  50 70 88 
2008  55 71 88 
2009H1  10 15 10 
2008H2-2009H1  60 85 98 
All figures are percentages. 
 
Table 2: The Effect of Public Interventions on Loan Mix  
After:    












British Access to Unusual Loans/Liquidity (δUK) 1.8 
(1.2) 
 




British Capital Injection (ζUK) -1.0 
(.9) 
 




British Privatization  n/a  
Foreign=British effects (p-value)  .00**  
Foreign=British effects except Nationalisation (p-value) .23  
Observations  9,615 9,615  
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R2  .92 .92 
RMSE  9.21 9.21 
Dependent variable: 100(domestic loans/(domestic + foreign loans)).  Coefficients for row dummy variables; 
robust standard errors recorded in parentheses (clustered by time) unless recorded otherwise.  One (two) 
asterisk(s) mark coefficients significantly different from zero at .05 (.01) significance level.  Each column 
represents a separate LS regression.  Observations from quarterly panel, spanning 1997Q3-2010Q1 for 361 
banks.  Dummies are +1 for time during/after British banks/event, -1 for foreign banks/events.  Time- and 
bank-specific fixed effects included but not recorded.  
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Dependent variable: domestic loans/(domestic + foreign loans), expressed as a percentage.  Coefficients for 
column dummy variables; robust standard errors recorded in parentheses (clustered by time) unless recorded 
otherwise. One (two) asterisk(s) mark coefficients significantly different from zero at .05 (.01) significance 
level.  Each row represents a separate LS regression.  Dummies are +1 for British banks/event, -1 for foreign 
banks/events except for nationalisations and privatisations.  Default regression has 9,615 observations from 
quarterly panel spanning 1997Q3-2010Q1 for 361 banks.  Time- and bank-specific fixed effects included but 




External MPC Unit Discussion Paper No.32 May 2011 21































































































































































Dependent variable: 100(domestic loans/(domestic + foreign loans)).  Coefficients for column dummy variables; 
robust standard errors recorded in parentheses (clustered by time), conventional for bottom row. One (two) 
asterisk(s) mark coefficients significantly different from zero at .05 (.01) significance level.  Default regression 
has 9,615 observations from quarterly panel spanning 1997Q3-2010Q1 for 361 banks.  Time- and bank-specific 
fixed effects included but not recorded. 
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Dependent variable: 100(domestic loans/(domestic + foreign loans)).  Coefficients for column dummy variables; 
robust standard errors recorded in parentheses (clustered by time) unless recorded otherwise. One (two) 
asterisk(s) mark coefficients significantly different from zero at .05 (.01) significance level.  Default regression 























































Dependent variable: domestic loans/(domestic + foreign loans), expressed as a percentage.  Coefficients for 
column dummy variables; robust standard errors recorded in parentheses (clustered by time) unless recorded 
otherwise. One (two) asterisk(s) mark coefficients significantly different from zero at .05 (.01) significance 
level.  Each row represents a separate LS regression.  Dummies are +1 for British banks/event, -1 for foreign 
banks/events except for nationalisations.  Default regression has 9,615 observations from quarterly panel 
spanning 1997Q3-2010Q1 for 361 banks.  Time- and bank-specific fixed effects included but not recorded.  Set 
#1 of controls includes: loan growth; asset growth; log total assets; capital adequacy; assets/capital (leverage); 
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Unusual Access to 




























































































Dependent variable: Interest rate for private non-financial corporation loans of less than one year maturity.  
Variant is interest rate for households and individual trust loans of less than one year maturity.  Coefficients 
for column dummy variables; robust standard errors recorded in parentheses (clustered by time) unless 
recorded otherwise. One (two) asterisk(s) mark coefficients significantly different from zero at .05 (.01) 
significance level.  Each row represents a separate LS regression.  Dummies are +1 for British banks/event, -1 
for foreign banks/events except for nationalisations.  Default regression has 679 observations from quarterly 
panel spanning 2004Q1-2010Q1 for 35 large banks active in the UK.  Time- and bank-specific fixed effects 
included but not.  No privatisations occurred in the sample.  
 
External MPC Unit Discussion Paper No.32 May 2011 24
 
Figure 1: Contributions to Growth in Lending to UK Businesses 
(Monetary financial institutions’ lending to private non-financial corporations. 

































Data for up to 487 banks, 1997Q3-2010Q1
Bank Lending by Bank Nationality 
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Figure 2: Loan Mixture varies by Nationality 
 




























































Bank Lending for Periods after Public Interventions 
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Figure 4: Histograms of the Loan Mix for non-British Banks 
Data Appendix 
We collect the raw data from the AL, BT, CC, CE, ER, IS, PL and QD forms. A detailed 
description of these forms (along with the forms themselves) is available at 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/reporters/defs/defs.htm.  The variables actually 
used in our regressions are transformed from the raw data as described below. 
 
 
Variable  Item in form 
Share of Domestic in Total 
Lending, “Loan Mix” 
AL  19 [Total Lending to UK residents] / (AL  19 [Total Lending to UK 
residents] +CC15 [Total external claims on non-resident customers]) 
Share of Domestic in Total 
Lending (Denominator 
Variant) 
AL  19 [Total Lending to UK residents ]/ (AL  19 [Total Lending to UK 
residents] +CC1 [Total loans and advances to non-residents]) 




Size  BT 40 [Total Assets] 
Asset Growth  Growth rate of BT 40 [Total Assets] 
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Capital adequacy ((Capital + 
Reserves)/Total Assets) 
BT 19 [Capital and Other funds]/ BT 40 [Total Assets] 
Capital adequacy ((Capital + 
Reserves)/Total Assets), 
Variant 








BT 40 [Total Assets]/ BT 19 [Capital and Other funds] 
Wholesale Market 
Dependence 
BT 6 [Liabilities under Sale and Repurchase Agreements] / BT 20 
[Total Liabilities] 
 
Non Performing Loan Ratio  PL 20B [Financial Level of Provisions for Bad and Doubtful Debts] / 
BT 40 [Total Assets] 
Profitability  PL 21 [Retained Profit after Provisions for Bad and Doubtful Debts] / 
BT 40 [Total Assets] 
Profitability, Variant 1  PL 19 [Retained Profit before Provisions for Bad and Doubtful Debts] / 
BT 40 [Total Assets] 
Profitability, Variant 2  PL 15 [Pre-tax profits on ordinary activities before provisions for bad 
and doubtful debts] / BT 40 [Total Assets] 
Dividends/ Assets  PL 17 [Dividends paid]  / BT 40 [Total Assets] 
Effective interest Rates on 
loans to Private non‐
financial corporations 
ERC102  [Private non-financial corporations  Time – fixed original 
maturity <= 1 year (maturity)] 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1  http://www.londonsummit.gov.uk/en/summit-aims/summit-communique/ or 
http://www.g20.org/Documents/final-communique.pdf 
2  http://www.pittsburghsummit.gov/mediacenter/129639.htm or 
http://www.g20.org/Documents/pittsburgh_summit_leaders_statement_250909.pdf 
3  But see http://www.globaltradealert.org/ 
4  For instance, the topic is ignored by e.g., La Porta et al (2002) and Megginson (2005). 
5  To the best of our knowledge, there is no theory of relevance in this area. 
6  This aggregate evidence is supported by the disaggregated work of Aiyar (2011) who find “Foreign subsidiaries 
and branches reduced lending by a larger amount than domestically owned banks”. 
7  Even if this were the case, work by Ehrman, Gambacorta, Martinez-Pages, Sevestre and Worms (2001) 
shows, in the case of Euro-Area countries, that BankScope data can suggest very different answers than more 
complete data available at national central banks. 
8 This data set is only available on a locational, as opposed to a consolidated, basis. This difference in reporting 
may be important for some questions regarding cross-border lending, but it is irrelevant for ours. Consolidated data 
records ‘pure’ cross border lending at the banking group level as an external claim, netting out within-banking 
group transfers. In our analysis of the loan mix we are interested in whether domestic claims change with respect to 
the sum of domestic and external claims, regardless of composition. The distinction between consolidated and 
locational data seems to be therefore irrelevant.  Furthermore, the results with the ‘loan mix’ are confirmed by the 
effective interest rate data, suggesting that this distinction is probably not affecting our results.   
9 To maintain transparency, we do not try to adjust the data for mergers and acquisitions. If one bank is bought by 
another, then the former drops out of our sample, while the latter’s lending artificially expands by the acquired 
institution.  If as a result of nationalization, a foreign bank in Britain needs to sell its domestic operations, its UK 
lending would thus shrink artificially. In other words, our methodology would pick up this sale of domestic UK 
operations as financial protectionism.  However, our data on bank ownership does not suggest that foreign 
nationalised banks systematically sold off their operations in the UK.  
10 The CC item captures lending to all non- residents. But strictly speaking, a test of the proposed financial 
protectionism hypothesis requires data on external lending to a given banks’ country of ownership. A finer 
geographical decomposition of this item is available. But claims on the country of ownership miss any lending 
that is directed at the home country, but sent via branches and subsidiaries in third countries. The aggregate 
CC item includes these third country transfers, which is why it is our preferred measure in this study.  
11  The Bank of England uses this data to monitor the transmission of changes in the policy rate through the 
British banking sector to the broader economy (see 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/reporters/defs/def_er.pdf).   
12  See http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/mfsd/iadb/notesIADB/effective_int.htm 
13  For instance, our classification turns out to be consistent with the database on policy interventions in the 
current crisis (including bank nationalisations), provided by Ait-Sahalia, Andritzky, Jobst, Nowak and Tamirisa 
(2009). 
14 By unusual access to liquidity we refer to the case where banks received larger amounts of liquidity against assets 
of lower quality than in normal times. It is important to point out that not all banks chose to access these facilities 
during the crisis (in some countries the degree of access was public information; in these countries, the associated 
stigma led to a degree of adverse selection among the institutions accessing central banks liquidity facilities). In 
other words, unusual liquidity provision was not always universal. 
15  For this reason we construct our nationalisation variables with opposite signs for British and foreign banks 
after nationalisation. 
16 Our Tobit model controls for both the lower (0) and the upper (1) bound of the “loan mix”. 
17 Asides from our control variables, we tried an additional instrument on the liabilities side of the balance sheet, 
namely the ratio of interbank and financial market to total sight deposits. Banks with a large fraction of this ratio 
are dependent on very short-term funding and are likely to have a business model that is probably more vulnerable 
to sudden funding stops. But it is not clear why this ratio would determine a banks “loan mix”. We used this 
variable as an instrument for foreign nationalisation and found that the coefficient keeps the same sign and is 
statistically significant, but that the size increases by a magnitude of 4 to -38.08. Unfortunately data on this variable 
is only available since October 2007, but this does suggest that our results are robust to concerns about endogeneity.  